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Hopeful Commitment
Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-
Government. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. Pp 272. $ 35,
cloth.
Hirokazu Miyazaki*
In Freedom and Time, Jed Rubenfeld asserts, "Time is necessary in a
special way to the being of things human: of human being and hence of
human freedom."' Noting the pervasive impulse to link the idea of "living
in the present" with the notion of freedom, Rubenfeld suggests that "a
people can govern itself only by both being governed by its past and
governing its future."2 According to Rubenfeld, most preexisting theories
in constitutional law such as present-consensus constitutionalism,
proceduralism, contractarianism, originalism, hypothetical-consent theory,
and liberalism are based on an inadequate idea of temporality because they
all rest on what he calls a "speech-modeled" conception of constitutional
self-government: "If legitimate political authority derives from the will of
the governed, then fundamental rights can be legitimated only by deriving
them either (1) from the will of the governed at some particular
moment-whether past, present, or predicted--or else (2) from truths
lying outside the domain of temporal authority altogether."3 Thus,
Rubenfeld contends, "Constitutional law is irreducibly temporal, and yet
also irreducible to the political will of any given moment."4
In order to restore a temporal horizon to the idea of constitutional self-
government, Rubenfeld proposes a shift from speech to writing as a
paradigm of self-government: "Government by present voice is
incompatible with law, because law can never be merely spoken. It
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requires a writing; it requires language preserved over time."5 According
to Rubenfeld, this temporal reorientation in constitutional law would solve
many apparent conundrums in constitutional law, such as the so-called
counter-majoritarian difficulty, as such problems arise from the speech-
modeled conception of self-government.6 The book is devoted to a
demonstration of this possibility.
At the heart of Rubenfeld's theory of constitutional self-government is
his theory of commitment. By commitment, Rubenfeld means "an
enduring normative determination made in the past to govern the future."7
Rubenfeld asserts:
democratic self-government is itself something that exists, if it exists
at all, only over time.... [D]emocracy consists not in governance by
the present will of the governed, or in governance by the a-temporal
truths posited by one or another moral philosopher, but rather in a
people's living out its own self-given political and legal
commitments over time-apart from or even contrary to popular will
at any given moment.
In developing his theory of commitment, Rubenfeld first seeks to
differentiate his notion of commitment from the notion of precommitment
often invoked in debates about rationality: "Commitments give agents
reason to act, but to make this commitmentarian reason intelligible
requires a break with standard modem accounts of rationality, which are
oriented to an agent's present aims or preferences."9 According to
Rubenfeld, "Commitments... are precisely the kind of normative
embrace of the future necessary to a self that conducts itself, much of the
time, within temporally extended engagements that it has given itself."'"
Like the idea of precommitment, Rubenfeld's notion of commitment is
self-binding: "It is critical that some basic interpretation be given a chance
to establish itself, to become part of our practices. Otherwise the
commitments are never made real."" Unlike precommitment, however,
commitment is ultimately open-ended: "It is part of the nature of a
commitment that its full entailments can never be known until they have
been lived out, and lived under, for an extended period of time....
Commitments have to be filled in and filled out through an ongoing task
of interpretation." 2
5. Id. at 86.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Id. at 92.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id. at 93.
10. Id. at 128.
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Rubenfeld's theory of constitutional self-government also entails a
redefinition of the notion of a people as a form of political subjectivity:
"Commitmentarian democracy holds that a people, understood as an agent
existing over time, across generations, is the proper subject of democratic
self-government."' 3 According to Rubenfeld, the currently popular notion
of peoples as imaginary only results from a speech-based conception of a
people that is in turn based on the idea of language-based homogeneity.14
This predication of political subjectivity on cultural homogeneity by
nature generates a tension between collective and individual agents:
We do not owe our popularity to any shared set of cultural,
psychological, or biological characteristics that might confer upon us
as a unique national identity. We must give up altogether the search
for this sort of homogenous national identity, in which a certain set of
values or traits is imagined as defining the unique and essential
national character.
15
Instead, Rubenfeld proposes the notion of a people based on a shared
commitment to a written constitution: "There must be room for a nation
whose members struggle, despite and indeed because of their individual
differences, to be the collective authors of their own foundational law."' 6
In other words, "A people, for purposes of democratic self-government, is
the set of persons co-existing under the rule of a particular political-legal
order."' 7 According to Rubenfeld,
a temporally extended people cannot speak in... [one] voice. It can
only inscribe itself, over time, into the world. Constitutional
interpretation in written self-government must itself be a written
project, an enterprise in which one [text] is intermeshed with another
and another over a long period of time. It cannot be reduced to an
authoritative, clarifying pronouncement by the people, even a
pronouncement made in unison by every living citizen at a sublime
constitutional moment.' 8
From this standpoint, Rubenfeld declares, "democracy does not consist
in effectuation of majority will, but is rather the temporally extended
popular struggle for authorship of the nation's legal and political
commitments."' 9
Rubenfeld defines his temporal reorientation as a move away from the
kind of presentism that he believes defines modernity: "Modernity created
the present moment-created it as the exclusive site of being, and hence as
13. Id. at 145.
14. Id. at 149.
15. Id. at 151.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 153.
18. Id. at 173.
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the exclusive site of will and freedom., 2° He cites a wide range of thinkers
from Rousseau to Jefferson and Freud as advocates of such presentist
freedom. Ultimately, Rubenfeld seeks to restore the future (as well as the
past) in the conception of freedom: "passionate engagement with the
world and with the future is a central element of human freedom. 21 In
more general terms, Freedom and Time is a passionate call for a vision for
the future in American constitutional politics:
Our politics grows ever more insipid as it grows ever more attentive
to what we want, or say we want, here and now. We have today a
productive capacity enabling us to realize our dreams to an extent
beyond the wildest dreams of those who lived before us-if only we
had dreams!
What are our ambitions, here in America, what plans do we have with
respect to our unprecedented technological power? What ambitions
do we have for the next fifty years? The next five? Other than
enhancing the usual economic indicators, none. At this moment, at
this millennium, it would seem we have no future. Let us live to see
that change.22
Rubenfeld's passionate appeal to futurity rests on his conviction that
human life is resolutely temporal and that the idea of "living in the
present" is nothing more than an abstraction:
To say that I am what I am only over time is to say something very
different from the proposition that what I am is decisively shaped by
what I have been, or that I will continue to be the person I am over
time. If I am I only over time, then there is never a present moment at
which I can say, I am. I do not now exist. At any given moment, there
will have been an I only by virtue of my having led a human life.23
Furthermore, Rubenfeld points to the trivial character of the present
moment:
The present is small. Living in it is the refuge of those who cannot
bear the large responsibility for living over time, the responsibility
for what they have been and will be. We are all familiar with this
smallness. It is what we feel when, "going about our business" in the
"hurry that modern working conditions demand," we have the sense
of having filled our lives pursuing the most minuscule and shallow of
objects.2 4
The problem of the present has animated debates among generations of
philosophers. This is partially because of the incongruity between the
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. at 92.
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id- at 16.
[Vol. 15:453
4
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol15/iss2/8
Miyazaki
temporally stretched character of interpretive work and the seemingly
ungraspable character of the present conceived as a fleeting point.25 In
more general terms, the problem of the present has served as a problem
paradigmatic of the problem of self-knowledge. The two problems share a
single broader epistemological difficulty arising from a lack of distance
between interpretive work and its object. In this sense, as Rubenfeld
rightly suggests in Freedom and Time, the problem of the present is
central to the problem of modem knowledge that seeks to understand what
has produced itself.
In light of this, however, I wish to suggest that Rubenfeld's future-
oriented solution to the problem of the present is directly relevant to at
least two radically different efforts to reintroduce futurity in philosophy.
First, Rubenfeld's theory of the temporal character of self-formation
recalls American pragmatists' rendition of the present as temporally
stretched and its accompanied redefinition of the concept of self. In The
Principles of Psychology, for example, William James famously redefines
the notion of the present: "The practically cognized present is no knife-
edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit
perched, and from which we look in two directions into time."26 This
redefinition of the present follows James's notion of the "stream of
thought" in the consciousness of self. G.H. Mead also develops the idea of
"the present as the locus of reality" and approaches self as emergent.2 7
Rubenfeld's theory of constitutional self-government would have
benefited greatly from a serious engagement with this American
intellectual tradition. In particular, Rubenfeld's engagement with
American pragmatists' theory of temporality would have constituted an
interesting interjection to wider debates about pragmatism in constitutional
law and legal theory, more generally.
28
Second, and more importantly, Rubenfeld's theory of commitment
resonates with some early twentieth-century German philosophers' efforts
to redeploy eschatological temporality as a solution to the modem problem
of the present. Rubenfeld dismisses such theological renditions of the
present as reminiscent of early Christian millenarian faith and asserts,
"when this Christian 'wakefulness' wakes from its dreams of a millennial
future and becomes a matter of 'Dasein's being wakeful for itself,' then it
assumes a modem form." 29 Yet, it is important to note that these modem
deployments of eschatology have focused not so much on the character of
the millenarian end as on the character of retrospection entailed in
25. See HIROKAZU MIYAZAKI, THE METHOD OF HOPE (forthcoming 2004).
26. WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 574 (1981).
27. See G.H. MEAD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT (1959).
28. See PRAGMATISM 1N LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
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eschatological imaginations.30 In his well-known Theses on the Philosophy
of History, for example, Walter Benjamin famously notes: "Only that
historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is
firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he
wins."'" Hope in the past points to its future moment of fulfillment (or
redemption), and the historian's role is to realize this moment.32 In
Benjamin's hopeful reconceptualization of history as messianic
retrospection, as I have argued elsewhere, hope in the past is in turn
replicated in the present as the historian's own hope for salvation.33 In the
temporality of hope, the present becomes a point of articulation between
the unfulfilled past and a horizon of expectation for future moments of
fulfillment. In a similar fashion, I argue, Rubenfeld's theory of
commitment stretches in two temporal directions (to the past as well as to
the future) and seeks to chart a horizon of future commitments.
This somewhat idiosyncratic juxtaposition of Rubenfeld's theory of
constitutional self-government with American pragmatism on the one
hand, and with a tradition of German philosophy on the other, becomes
acutely pertinent in light of the contemporary pragmatist philosopher
Richard Rorty's recent call for "hope in place of knowledge."34 In a series
of essays entitled Philosophy and Social Hope, Rorty seeks to turn
philosophy to the future and ultimately suggests, following John Dewey,
that "we can, in politics, substitute hope for the sort of knowledge which
philosophers have usually tried to attain."35 Rorty anchors the notion of
hope in his commitment to America and Americans' capacity to create a
better future. It is important to note that Rorty tries hard to avoid elements
of teleology in this temporal reorientation, however. According to Rorty,
pragmatic hope is predicated on a commitment to "principled and
deliberate fuzziness. '36 In Rorty's view, therefore, hope is not so much
about its concrete object as a perspective on the future it generates: "The
vista, not the endpoint, matters."37 Both the pragmatist philosophers and
the German philosophers discussed above share with Rorty their
willingness to dwell on a delicate balance between determinacy and
indeterminacy. Rubenfeld's theory of constitutional self-government is
30. See WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS (Hanna Arendt ed. & Harry Zohn trans., Fontana
Press 1992) (1974); ERNST BLOCH, THE PRINCIPLE OF HOPE (1986).
31. WALTER BENJAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 30,
at 245, 247.
32. See PETER SZONDI, ON TEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND OTHER ESSAYS (Harvey Mendelsohn
trans., 1986).
33. See MIYAZAKI, supra note 25.
34. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE (1999).
35. Id. at 24.
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precisely an expression of a similar kind of future-oriented commitment as
a source of hope in the present.
7
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